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PRESERVaTION, PaSSIVITy, 
aNd PESSIMISM1
SHEIla lINTOTT
Many committed and passionate environmental thinkers currently 
champion restoration as an appropriate and positive model for human-
nature interaction and interdependence. Recent philosophical defenses 
of restoration sidestep the issues that have been raised about the possibil-
ity of restoring degraded nature to a state that is identical, ontologically 
or evaluatively, to some pre-degraded state. Informed by feminist theory, 
I expose and explore some problematic assumptions and associations 
found in common defenses of restoration and defend the thesis that pres-
ervation is the more promising avenue to character remediation and the 
forging of a harmonious human-nature culture. I allow that many resto-
ration projects will be appropriate under a preservationist program; but 
insist that preservation should be the main approach endorsed. 
Whether it’s the 2010 BP oil spill or mountaintop removal in the Ap-
palachians, it is clear that nature has been degraded and human activity 
threatens further degradation. Sound theoretical guidance is desperately 
needed to inform sound practice. Environmental philosophy is a good 
place to look for guidance, particularly to debates concerning restoration. 
These debates often focus on values promulgated via restoration. Ques-
tions are asked about the value produced by restoration efforts: Does re-
stored nature have the same quality or quantity of value as pre-degraded 
nature? About the value arising in the process of restoration activity: Does 
participating in restoration activity encourage increased respect for na-
ture? About the values that motivate restoration policy: Does confidence 
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that we can heal nature smack of arrogance? And about the attitude en-
dorsed by restorationists: Does restoration offer us hope for healthy and 
positive human-to-nature relationships while other approaches do not? 
Varying answers to these questions tend to recommend either restora-
tion or preservation as the dominant environmental policy, with the other 
being subsumed under it.2
The history of the preservation-restoration debate is complex, with 
the two sometimes aligned and sometimes with one more publicly favored 
than the other. Today, restoration seems more popular, with many com-
mitted and passionate environmental thinkers championing it as provid-
ing the most appropriate guidelines for human action regarding nature. 
The case for restoration takes as basic the idea that where one contributes 
to a problem or benefits from such contributions, one has an obligation to 
contribute to its solution. I too take this as a given, but want to question 
whether restoration is generally the better means to discharging this obli-
gation than is preservation. Recent attempts to articulate aims of restora-
tion that go beyond returning degraded nature to a state that is identical, 
ontologically or evaluatively, to some pre-degraded state are admittedly 
more promising than their predecessors, but I remain unconvinced that 
restoration should trump preservation as a means to these ends. My thesis 
is that preservation is the more promising approach when the aim is char-
acter remediation and the forging of a culture that sincerely values nature 
and living harmoniously within it. I allow that many restoration projects 
will be appropriate under a preservationist program; but insist that pres-
ervation should be the main approach endorsed. 
In section one, I question the extent to which restoration will help in 
providing character remediation to those of us (basically, all of us) who 
have contributed to the environmental problems we face. I offer reasons 
to doubt that restoration promises to be as broadly effective in achieving 
these ends as its enthusiasts predict. In section two, I explore the extent 
to which restorationist criticisms of preservation are informed by a prob-
lematic value dualism, one that not only calls the soundness of their case 
into question, but also suggests they remain, albeit unknowingly, tied to 
a worldview that needs to be jettisoned if we are to move in the direction 
of a harmonious human-nature community. In section three, I argue that 
a primary focus on preservation is not unduly pessimistic as some resto-
rationists suggest; instead I characterize preservationism as maintaining 
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what Nietzsche calls pessimism of strength, rather than the optimism of 
weakness I unearth under a primary commitment to restoration. 
ConCerning the optimism of restorationism 
In a recent article, John Basl discusses environmental restoration 
in terms of restitution, which he defines as “the act of making right in 
response to making wrong” (Basl, 138). Analyzing restitution into two 
components, a reparative and a remediative component, he argues that 
in some cases of wrongdoing, notably in many cases of environmental 
degradation, only remediation is required. Remediation is always required 
when “the wrong committed is not an anomaly, but rather the wrongdo-
ing is intimately tied to the character of the wrongdoer” (142). And reme-
diation aims at character remediation of the guilty parties: for example, 
someone who ridicules a homeless person behind the person’s back would 
benefit from working in a homeless shelter for a while, which we would 
hope would help remediate his character in the needed manner. Other pro-
ponents of restoration discuss the issues within the context of creating a 
community with or of nature. For example, Andrew Light views the value 
of restoration in terms of creating a culture of nature, a culture in which 
an appropriate relationship between humans and nature is restored. Light 
insists it is a mistake to see restoration as “only an attempt to restore na-
ture itself, rather than an effort to restore an important part of the human 
relationship with nonhuman nature” (Light, 49). According to Light, the 
value of restoration is found primarily in the contribution it makes to-
wards “the revitalization of the human culture of nature” (Light, 49). 
Basl’s and Light’s attempts to defend restoration center on the effects 
restoration might have on people—on their characters or their relation-
ships with nature. Thus, they sidestep the metaphysical and epistemologi-
cal objections made against restoration by critics such as Eric Katz and 
Robert Elliot. For example, Katz and Elliot argue that because humans 
are ontologically distinct from nature, human intervention in nature can 
only produce artifacts; therefore, the result of restoration is valuable as 
an artifact not nature. So, strictly speaking, restoration is metaphysically 
impossible. Another question has been raised about whether we have the 
requisite knowledge base to restore nature, pointing out that much of the 
harm humans cause results from acting in ignorance or arrogance. As 
Holmes Rolston III points out, restorations pale in comparison with the 
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original: “The diversity of species may not be there, nor the complexity of 
ecosystemic interrelations. So the restored system will lack integrity” (Rol-
ston 2000, 128). Moreover, the decision regarding to which pre-degraded 
moment in history to restore seems arbitrary. According to these criti-
cisms, successful restoration is metaphysically impossible and difficult to 
dangerous epistemologically. However, according to Basl’s account, these 
critics focus on what is often an inessential component of environmental 
restoration: reparation. And according to Light, they fail to appreciate the 
role restoration might play in restoring a more appropriate human-na-
ture culture. I applaud these recent efforts to defend restoration on more 
pragmatic grounds, yet I remain skeptical. My skepticism is due primarily 
to the scope of the character remediation needed and the varying ways 
restoration might affect or fail to affect individuals’ characters. 
Restorationists maintain that restoration can be deeply satisfying to 
human participants. William Jordan III, who characterizes restoration as 
“simply the active attempt to compensate for human influence on an eco-
logical system in order to return the system to its historic condition,” finds 
that restoration through prairie burns afford us an awesome opportunity 
for beginning to build a human-nature community (Jordan 2000b, 217). 
By illustrating how nature needs us, prairie burns allow us to celebrate 
this fact of dependency and to enjoy a related feeling of community with 
nature. 
The burns are really the quintessential or emblematic act of prairie 
restoration. They have become a rite of spring, eagerly anticipated 
by the growing number of “prairie people” involved in restoration 
efforts in the Midwest, and are often surrounded by a festive, joyful, 
atmosphere. Reflecting on this development, several years ago, Fred 
Turner put forward what I believe is a good explanation for it…the 
need of the prairie for fire dramatizes its dependence on us, and so 
liberates us from our position as naturalists or observers of the com-
munity into a role of real citizenship.” (Jordan 2000b, 213) 
I find this confusing. I can’t help but wonder how seeing any human 
action as dramatizing nature’s dependence on us will help cultivate the 
sort of virtues needed to build an appropriate human-nature community 
and to dispel the consumerist vices that have contributed to the environ-
mental crises we face. I can see why working to counter past degradation 
makes one feel good, satisfied that one has helped to clean up a serious 
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mess, a mess that one has in all likelihood contributed to, but I don’t see 
how this shows that nature is dependent on us. And I don’t see it as a rea-
son for celebration as Turner and Jordan do. Does Jordan mean that we 
should celebrate the fact that nature is dependent on us for its existence? 
It isn’t—however you define it, nature pre-existed us and will, in all prob-
ability, survive us. Does Jordan mean that nature is dependent on us for its 
health? Nature is sometimes negatively affected by our behavior and we 
can sometimes undo some of this damage, but this is not the same thing as 
saying that nature is dependent on us. I might be deserving of reparation 
from someone who has wronged me without being dependent on that per-
son at all. It is true that humans and nonhuman nature are interrelated in 
a variety of (known and unknown) ways, but interdependence is not the 
same thing as dependence. Does Jordan mean that in its current degraded 
state, nature is dependent on us? Admittedly, it seems to be to some extent. 
For example, after destructive and pervasive alterations, prairies may need 
our intervention in order to return to and sustain important ecosystemic 
processes. But celebrating this dependency without admitting we created 
it is to avoid taking full responsibility for our actions—it cause for con-
cern, not celebration.
Perhaps I am being too literal; perhaps Jordan is merely suggesting 
that seeing nature as something we can affect—positively and negatively—
illustrates its dependence on us, which is conducive to our bonding with 
nature by cultivating a sense of responsibility for our actions regarding 
it. Maybe seeing nature’s dependence on us can motivate us to act more 
responsibly in the way that grasping his baby’s dependence and vulner-
ability can motivate a father to act responsibly toward the baby. Parents 
frequently are touched by their children’s vulnerability in this way. How-
ever, nature simply is not vulnerable in this way. Nature does not need 
us to survive; nature will continue long after us and would probably, in 
some sense, be better off without us. Truth be told, we are the vulnerable, 
dependent ones in the human-nature relationship. Restorationists some-
times seem reluctant to admit this.
Some restorationists emphasize the collaborative nature of their prac-
tice, seeing restoration ultimately as a way to (re-)enfranchise and (re-
)liberate nature. For example, Trish Glazebrook describes the practice of 
restoration in the oil industry as follows: “The actual practice of restora-
tion in the oil industry does not ‘make nature’ at all, but rather involves 
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providing the right conditions, and then allowing the time for nature to 
heal itself. The process is more about patience than mastery and control” 
(Glazebrook, 30). One sometimes finds evidence of such an attitude in 
the best versions of restoration; however, one should look carefully at 
the sentiments expressed in public and professional debates on the topic 
and at how the practice actually plays out to discern whether restoration 
is always as humble, collaborative, and patient as Glazebrook’s recount 
makes it seem. For example, take Turner’s excitement and optimism about 
restoration as a normative paradigm; it is, literally, otherworldly:
If we are alone [i.e. if we are the only intelligent life in the universe], 
then we carry a gigantic responsibility. We are the custodians of life in 
the universe, and the only plausible vector by which life may propa-
gate itself to other worlds…. But one day the long discipline of resto-
ration may bear a strange and unexpected fruit, and an alien sun may 
shine on miles of blowing prairie. (Turner, 203) 
I am sincerely taken aback by such a suggestion and do not detect any 
humility or collaboration in it. Perhaps a few readers are thinking that 
colonizing other worlds is ethically unproblematic, so long as no persons 
or sentient beings are colonized in the process. However, there are two 
things to note about this. First, the attitude expressed here is compatible 
with a willingness to accept degradation as given and to simply move on 
and away from it via technological means—an attitude that sees human 
life as the most important life on this planet (and perhaps on others). This 
is not an attitude that is conducive to healthy human-nature relationships. 
And this leads to another issue, if we deal with past mistakes by leaving 
them and moving on to new venues, what’s to stop humanity from con-
tinuing on in this manner—world-hopping, as it were? Add to this the 
fact that many astronomers now believe that in all probability we are not 
alone, that is, that we do not represent the only intelligent life in the uni-
verse. If so, then dreams of colonizing other planets need to be checked by 
the possibility that other beings may already inhabit those worlds.
I find myself here reminded of Val Plumwood’s wise counsel against 
even contemplating colonizing distant planets before we can learn to live 
well on this one. As she says, “Perhaps the most important task for human 
beings is not to search the stars to converse with cosmic beings but to 
learn to communicate with the other species that share this planet with us” 
(Plumwood 2002, 189). I find similar reasoning applicable to the debate 
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over restoration and I suggest that the most important task for human be-
ings is not to seek greater mastery over nature to create nature anew (here 
or elsewhere), but to learn to coexist peacefully with and to fully respect 
the nature that exists here and persists in each of us. I partially agree with 
Jordan that “the real challenge of environmentalism is not to preserve 
nature by protecting it from human beings or rescuing it from their influ-
ence, but to provide the basis for a healthy relationship between nature 
and culture” (Jordan 2000b, 208). My agreement is partial because, at this 
point in time, forging “a healthy relationship between nature and culture” 
necessarily involves privileging the preservation and protection of nature 
from human influence.
Moreover, we also need to worry about the likely cultural uptake 
of the practice of restoration; that is, how non-participants in the re-
search and physical work of restoration, which will be the vast majority 
of people, are likely to interpret and understand the process of restora-
tion. Most likely participants will already be relatively virtuous concern-
ing environmental matters. Those most in need of character remediation 
might be aware of the projects but are far less likely to freely participate 
in them. From the point of view of a non-participating observer, Robert 
Elliot’s feared “replacement thesis” might come alive—that is, restoration 
projects might just provide what seem to be valid grounds to excuse the 
initial degradation and even justify future degradation (Elliot 2000). A 
non-participating observer who has heard talk of, for example, efforts to 
return wolves to Yellowstone Park might be impressed with the work and 
the science involved, and might then find in restoration a source of opti-
mism regardless of how she or other humans continue to behave. Given 
how the shock and awe of war seems to impress the public, it is reason-
able to worry that many could interpret restoration as the human ability 
to pillage and then restore nature, giving us the justification for consum-
erism in every corner of life–from big cars and big houses to big planes 
flying us to remote locations for big vacations in restored nature that can 
be re-restored when need be. Of course, this does not mean that restora-
tion does justify degradation, but it might easily be interpreted that way. 
So, restoration needs to be secondary to preservation unless we want to be 
satisfied with restored and re-restored nature, which will ultimately leave 
us with nothing tangible on which to base restorations. 
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ConCerning the passivity of preservationism
Restorationist rhetoric makes the contributions of preservation and, 
in fact, of nature less visible and often difficult to detect. This has been ac-
complished, not intentionally, but effectively nonetheless, by their implicit 
reliance on a dubious distinction between the active and the passive. Along 
with the hierarchical structure in which that dualism tends to be arranged, 
the active/passive dualism motivates much enthusiasm for restoration and 
underlies much dissatisfaction with preservation. In other words, given 
the choice between activity and passivity, activity is thought to be plainly 
the better of the two; for the same reasons, given the choice between res-
toration and preservation, restoration is thought to be plainly the better 
of the two. Valuing passivity or behaving in a way that is deemed passive, 
which frequently requires a great deal of effort and work, is seen as weak 
and ineffective, frequently as effeminate.
The active/passive dualism functions as a normative dualism in resto-
rationist criticism of preservation. Especially insidious when found sup-
porting seemingly benign or even beneficial activities, normative dualisms 
often justify or define oppressive practices as necessary, normal, or at least 
as the best alternative given the circumstances. Normative dualisms are 
conceived oppositionally and hierarchically, which is to say that each 
member of a pair is defined and understood in terms of being unlike the 
other and one is considered superior to the other. 
Questioning these normative dualisms can raise awareness of the con-
tinuity between the terms and thus a rejection of any hard and fast op-
position or hierarchy between them. Feminists argue that, in traditional 
Western philosophy, the hierarchical male/female dualism has been paral-
leled by the value dualisms of culture/nature, mind/body, active/passive, 
and rational/emotional. These parallels can be seen in the common as-
sociations of men with culture, mind, activity, and rationality and women 
with nature, body, passivity, and emotionality. The oppositionality here 
informs the normativity. Men should not stoop to being feminine; they 
should not be passive and emotional. Gendered normative dualisms have 
been influential and intricately involved throughout the history of western 
philosophy. Obvious examples quickly come to mind: Plato’s attack on art 
because its emotional appeal threatens the health of the (rational) soul; 
Descartes’ identification of himself as essentially mental and claim that his 
body is inessential; Aristotle’s judgment that the active is always superior 
to the passive; Kant’s reliance on the relative importance of culture. These 
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are just a few examples of philosophers relying on normative dualisms in 
an uncritical manner.
Dualisms, even hierarchical dualisms, alone are not the problem. It’s 
only when merged with a logic of domination, the idea that “superiority 
justifies subordination,” that differences become justifications or mandates 
and dualisms become normative (Warren, 22). A dualism becomes fully 
normative when it goes beyond abstractly classifying entities or evaluat-
ing entities to stipulate norms of behavior. The resulting domination can 
take the form of control, manipulation, coercion, annihilation, or limita-
tion; note that any of these can be (and are) completed under the guise 
of assistance. Most dangerous is that within a worldview governed by a 
logic of domination, it seems perfectly natural that the male controls the 
female, culture manipulates nature, the mind coerces the body, the active 
annihilates the passive, and rationality limits emotion.
G. Stanley Kane finds the logic behind restoration worrisome due to 
its similarities with seriously problematic ways of thinking about nature. 
He argues that:
Striking parallels exist between the old domination program and res-
toration. The most basic is that in both systems humans hold the 
place of highest authority and power within the world. Also, neither 
view recognizes any limits to the scope or range of legitimate human 
manipulation in the world. This does not mean that there are no con-
straints—only beneficial manipulations should be undertaken—but 
it does mean that nothing is intrinsically off-limits. A further paral-
lel is that because the fate of the world rests on humans, they must 
have a clear idea of what needs to be done. They must know what 
conditions are good (or at least what conditions are better) and then 
work to bring them about. Their activity, then, requires them to shape 
the world after ideas in their own mind. (Kane, 227; see also Katz 
1997b)
In other words, despite claims to the contrary, despite good intentions, 
and despite some manner of improvements, the logic of restoration im-
plements the allegedly jettisoned domination model according to which 
humans are superior to and thus justified in shaping nature as they see 
fit, whether they act on behalf of what they deem to be in their own or in 
nature’s interest. This logic of domination is coupled with the hierarchi-
cal dualism of the active and the passive in restorationist criticisms of 
preservation.
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An appreciation of the activity, the effort, and the work required in 
preservation is often lacking in restorationist critiques of preservation-
ism. The debate has absorbed the active/passive dualism in its full norma-
tive force. Preservation is not a merely negative policy; it mandates and 
requires a great deal of activity. However, it is the sort of activity that 
too frequently goes unnoticed and almost entirely unappreciated. It is the 
sort of activity usually associated with the female side of the male/female 
dualism. It is activity that, although its interaction isn’t always obvious, 
does positively or negatively affect others, through the agent’s self-control, 
restraint, respect, and patience, all of which demand great strength and 
effort. It is not the case that these seemingly passive acts happen without 
effort, without agency, without activity, as it is often supposed. (Think, 
for example, about the lack of credit given to mothers because they are 
allegedly naturally nurturing, doing, it seems, what comes naturally to 
them; their care work is often construed passively, as if it happens through 
them, rather than being work that requires serious effort, intellect, and 
conscious sacrifice.)
Jordan maintains that a successful environmentalism will be one that 
satisfies individuals at a personal level, and he does not believe preserva-
tionism can. 
At a personal level, [preservationism] survives in a culture that pro-
vides only an extremely limited repertory of ways for contacting 
nature—ways, I mean, that engage only a limited range of human 
interests, talents, and abilities. The result—unintended of course—is 
a kind of psychological elitism that accommodates those inclined by 
nature to the experience of observation and appreciation, but has less 
to offer the mechanics, nurturers, healers, hunters, gatherers, artists, 
craftsmen, pilots, planners, leaders, and ditch diggers among us. (And 
at a personal level, of course, it leaves those parts of each of us unsat-
isfied.) (Jordan 2000a, 31) 
The conclusion is that restoration is the more promising policy when it 
comes to forging a culture of nature. Preservationism is inept; it offers an 
“extremely limited” list of ways to engage with nature and appeals only 
to a select few of us, and only to a small part of each of us psychologi-
cally—the part that is interested in the relatively passive habits of “obser-
vation and appreciation.”
Yet Jordan’s charges of elitism should be turned on his own view. 
He suggests that “mechanics, nurturers, healers, hunters, gatherers, art-
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ists, craftsmen, pilots, planners, leaders, and ditch diggers among us” are 
not “inclined by nature to the experience of observation and apprecia-
tion.” This divides people into those who ‘do’ and those who ‘think,’ with 
the doers digging ditches and the thinkers satisfied with observation and 
appreciation. This is a double insult. For one, the suggested division of 
labor is faulty, for ditch diggers, hunters, and mechanics certainly better 
observe and appreciate, i.e., think before they act, lest they dig into a gas 
line, hunt a pet, or damage an engine in their rush to act. Second, while 
preservationists, whether they spend their time writing books or walking 
in the woods (or, most likely, both), certainly do observe and appreciate 
nature, in doing so, they engage in a great many additional activities. In 
selecting subjects for study, they discriminate between subjects according 
to their capacities, behaviors, and an array of other aspects, exerting ef-
fort to avoid influencing the objects of their study, and they work to make 
what they study meaningful in a broader context and to a broad audience. 
These are some of the many things that preservationists do when they 
“observe and appreciate.” Also, the talents that a preservationist has are 
shared with those engaged in a variety of other activities Jordan mentions; 
for example, the ability to detect subtle signs of flourishing would also be 
beneficial for a healer.
Moreover, to cultivate environmental virtues, profound cultural and 
individual changes are in order. Given this, we should be concerned about 
restorationists’ willingness to cater to existing attitudes, perceived needs, 
and desires in the environmental policy they endorse. Those attitudes, per-
ceived needs, and desires are at the very heart of the problem of environ-
mental degradation; many of them underwrite the environmental crisis in 
which we find ourselves today. The fact that preservation doesn’t satisfy 
such preexisting desires is not necessarily to be counted against it; indeed 
it may be part of its strength.
Plumwood analyzes the active/passive normative dualism in her cri-
tique of the concept of the postmodern idea of a “cultural landscape,” 
maintaining that the concept obscures the active and creative processes in 
the land (Plumwood 2006). She prefers to think of land on a collaborative 
model in which landscapes are seen as “interactive” or “collaborative,” 
and land in general as “a field of (product, outcome child/offspring of) 
multiple interacting and collaborating agencies which can include humans 
but is never exhausted by them” (Plumwood 2006, 125).
Plumwood’s critique summarizes the historical connection between 
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the active/passive dualism and domination and also focuses on the illu-
sion that land is passive matter upon which humans are permitted, even 
required to act and shape as we deem necessary. Her main thesis is that the 
contributions of the land are underacknowledged while those of humans 
are overacknowledged, but she attests to the complexity of the matter by 
emphasizing that in some cases the contributions of humans are underac-
knowledged. In these cases we might need to conceptually “‘denaturalize,’ 
to demote or supplement the emphasis on nature and note the presence 
of human influences which have been hidden, although this will rarely in-
volve a complete denial of the influence of nature” (Plumwood 2006, 132). 
Her critique ultimately takes aim at postmodern cultural reduction, the 
notion that all land is artifactual because in some way(s) it has been influ-
enced by human activity. The problem with this notion is that it obscures 
or even disappears the contributions of the land. She explains as follows:
But such a cultural reduction, which is often associated with certain 
forms of postmodernism, would abolish conceptual conditions for 
sensitivity to nature’s limits, and to the variations and interweavings 
of the human and nonhuman narratives an ecological consciousness 
aims to foster…. [P]ostmodernists… may think of themselves as in 
opposition to the dominant tradition, but are in fact at one with its 
dualizing approach in continuing to represent the Other, nature, as an 
absence or void, and to demote its agency. (Plumwood 2006, 138)
This view of the land as passive pervades restorationist rhetoric. Ac-
cording to the restorationist, as was discussed earlier, nature has been 
damaged by human intervention and will only be healed by the same. 
However, there is very little acknowledgment of the fact that nature has 
the ability to heal itself, often from the worst of human harm. For exam-
ple, a recent study by John Kessler of Texas A&M University published 
in Science “concludes that the vast quantity of methane gas that spewed 
from the BP oil well in the Gulf of Mexico was gobbled up rapidly by 
bacteria” (NPR). These results are preliminary and there is some question 
about whether the current or bacteria are responsible for the disappear-
ance of the gas, but “whatever happened to the natural gas, it does not 
seem to have caused obvious damage to the economically valuable ecosys-
tems, near the surface or near the shore, in the Gulf of Mexico” (NPR).
Reflecting on Plumwood’s analysis, we can also begin to sense that 
the optimism of the restorationist is not justified as it glosses a difficult 
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truth: human intervention will not solve the problems human intervention 
has caused. Instead, we must recover a respect for “nature’s limits” and 
find hope in the belief that nature acts in its own interests. The thrust of 
the human contribution to environmentalism should come from preser-
vationism’s active efforts to understand and protect nature, while these 
efforts will rightly be supplemented by restorationism. 
ConCerning the pessimism of preservationism 
Advocates of restoration say it introduces a “positive factor into the 
conservation equation,” in contrast to preservation which “at bottom it 
is deeply pessimistic” (Jordan 2003, 2). As one who accepts a “broadly 
preservationist environmental philosophy,” Ned Hettinger believes that 
“Nature is a subject owed moral concern fundamentally because of its 
independence from humanity and its autonomy from human domination 
and control” (Hettinger, 110). However, he worries that a preservationist 
philosophy like Katz’s leaves no “vision of a positive role for humanity in 
the natural world” and entails the view “that all human activity toward 
nature wrongs nature” (Hettinger, 110). Hettinger’s critique underscores 
the importance of finding “a benign human role in nature” and articulat-
ing “a vision of a constructive human relationship with nature, in addition 
to a characterization of our past failures of relationship” (Hettinger, 113, 
110). 
Turner, who explicitly criticizes preservationists for wallowing in 
guilt, tells us that preservationist science finds ecology
…essentially elegiac, essentially a eulogy to what we humans have de-
stroyed; their science is a postmortem, their myth is of a primal crime 
by which we are all tainted: the murder of nature. We cannot expiate, 
let alone compensate for this crime; the best we can do is acknowl-
edge it publicly by setting aside whatever relatively untouched places 
remain and keeping human beings out of them. For such perfection-
ists the study of nature is essentially passive and classificatory; action 
and experiment would be unwarranted…. It is possible to sympathize 
with such purists; they often serve as a conscience to humankind. But 
human beings are just as often ill-served by them—people are not at 
their best when motivated by guilt or alarm. If not actually paralyzed, 
they act mulishly, dutifully, without the joy and playfulness that liber-
ate the imagination and start the flow of creative thought. (Turner, 
197–98) 
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Contra Turner, remembering both what was lost and how it was lost, 
is often the more challenging and, I would argue, at times the more impor-
tant response to nature degradation than an attempt to reverse the harm 
in order to erase the guilt. A proper attitude towards degraded nature 
must involve a respectful remembrance of what has been lost, which res-
toration risks masking, sometimes unintentionally. As Katz says, “Nature 
restoration is a compromise; it should not be a basic policy goal. It is a 
policy that makes the best of a bad situation; it cleans up our mess. We are 
putting a piece of furniture over the stain in the carpet, for it provides a 
better appearance. As a matter of policy, however, it would be much more 
significant to prevent the causes of the stains” (Katz 1997a, 106). 
Admittedly, preservationists are not optimistic in the manner of some 
restorationists. For some restorationists, restoration is not merely a com-
promise. Some speak as if it is a paradigm of a healthy relationship with 
nature, a promising way to live in harmony with nature. For example, 
for Jordan, “ecosystem construction provides the basis for a healthy in-
teraction between human beings and the rest of nature. The key idea here 
is that we can best come to understand ecosystems, and to enter into a 
relationship with them that engages the full array of human activities, 
by attempting to reconstruct them” (Jordan 2000b, 208). Indeed, Jordan 
sees great potential for restoration as “a performing art and as the basis 
for a new ritual tradition for mediating the relationship between nature 
and culture” (Jordan 2000b, 214; See also Jordan 2003, Ch. 7). Further, 
consider Jordan’s optimism regarding the restorative role of humans in 
nature: 
…even more important—restoration, properly understood, turns out 
to be the key to the survival—or preservation—of all natural land-
scapes, not just those that have obviously been degraded or abused. 
(Jordan 2003, 14) 
The optimism in restoration expressed by Turner and Jordan puts me 
in mind of Nietzsche’s reflections on the ambiguity of the ideas of pes-
simism and optimism. Returning years later to reflect on his The Birth 
of Tragedy in “Attempt at A Self Criticism”, Nietzsche reconsiders the 
appropriateness of his earlier discussions of optimism and pessimism, as 
well as the common positive and negative associations usually made with 
each respectively. He first wonders whether pessimism is most accurately 
understood as a positive, even progressive attitude: 
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Is pessimism necessarily a sign of decline, decay, degeneration, weary 
and weak instincts…? Is there a pessimism of strength? An intellec-
tual predilection for the hard, gruesome, evil, problematic aspect of 
existence, prompted by well-being, by overflowing health, by the full-
ness of existence? (17) 
In other words, despite initial appearances, perhaps the more life-affirm-
ing philosophy is one of “a pessimism of strength”, according to which it 
is best to clearly assess and confront the reality of the situation in order 
to embrace it. 
On the other hand, Nietzsche considers whether optimism is a phi-
losophy that, in its very cheerfulness and hopefulness, requires a turning 
away from life, a denial of the seriousness of the problems that plague us. 
He wonders, therefore, whether optimism might be the more negative, 
even stunting philosophy—a sign of decline rather than progress. 
Might not this very [Socratic optimism] be a sign of decline, of weari-
ness, of infection, of the anarchical dissolution of the instincts? Is the 
resolve to be so scientific about everything perhaps a kind of fear of, 
an escape from, pessimism? A subtle last resort against—truth? And, 
morally speaking, a sort of cowardice and falseness? Amorally speak-
ing, a ruse? (17–18)
As opposed to the pessimism of strength detectable in preservationism, 
the unbridled optimism of some restorationist enthusiasts can be charac-
terized as an optimism of weakness, one that prefers to turn away from, 
rather than accept some of the truths of the matter. In this way, the op-
timism of restorationism can seem overly optimistic in the face of the 
real, lasting, and continuing damage human beings cause in nature. The 
more difficult option, which might be somewhat pessimistic, is found in 
the preservationist outlook that insists the best thing we can do now is to 
value leaving nature alone over further intervention. This requires a pes-
simism of strength and humility.
Picking up on the theme of the previous section, it is also worth not-
ing that the optimism of restoration is due in large part to our penchant 
for the active: we can be optimistic because we can fix the harm; we can 
right the wrong. The active/passive dualism is embodied in the logic seek-
ing to justify restoration as the best, sometimes as the only, acceptable 
way to deal with the harm we’ve caused. We can also detect remnants of 
the old domination model of the human to culture relationship, a model 
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that taught us such falsities as that nature needs to be humanized to be 
valuable, that cultural forces are always permitted to alter natural ones, 
and that acting is always better than being acted upon. Faced with a prob-
lem, for example, degraded nature, we fix it. It seems the respectable thing 
to do. We can’t just stand by and do nothing, we must rectify the situation. 
We’d like to believe that this is because we want to take responsibility for 
our actions and to do the right thing. However, it is also due to the fact 
that focusing instead on preservation may require admitting that we aren’t 
as powerful, knowledgeable, or capable as we like to believe. If we aren’t 
as powerful, knowledgeable, or capable as the task requires, we should 
not pretend we can fix the situation or solve the problem. Finding a solu-
tion, healing the harm, righting the wrong, all make us feel strong, but it 
is not real strength. Real strength is needed to admit that we caused harm 
that we cannot remedy, that here is a mess we’ve created to which we do 
not have any ready solution, complete cure, or adequate restitution. 
Admittedly, preservationism’s outlook is not excessively optimistic, 
but it does have a vision for positive human-nature interaction; preserva-
tionism allows for joy without delusion. Indeed, preservation refuses to 
ignore the damage humans have caused, through industry, through greed, 
through selfishness, through shortsightedness; but in light of this refusal, 
the preservationist finds intense joy, even sublimity, when confronted with 
the rare experience of preserved nature. Moreover, without inserting one-
self in the role of the savior, the preservationist retains hope for a wild fu-
ture. Consider Rolston’s discussion of forests, which I cannot help myself 
from quoting extensively:
In the primeval forest humans know the most authentic of wilderness 
emotions, the sense of the sublime. By contrast, few persons get goose 
pimples indoors, in art museums, in fashionable shopping centers, or 
at the city park… The sublime is perennial in encounter with nature 
because wherever people step to the edge of the familiar, everyday 
world, they risk encounter with grander, more provocative forces that 
touch heights and depths beyond normal experience, forces that tran-
scend us and both attract and threaten…. 
….But few forests are primeval—the more prosaic aesthetician 
will protest. Rare is the forest that has not been reshaped by human 
agency—by cutting up trees with chain saws, by cutting up forests 
with roads, by fencing forests around and running cattle through 
them, by intentionally planting more desirable species. There are also 
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the unintended changes, like the chestnut blight, or the understory 
invaded by honeysuckle.
Still, the forest, shaped by management and mismanagement 
though it may be, proves more able than the field or pasture to retain 
the natural element. Nature takes back over and does its thing: if it 
is not pristine activity, then still something relatively wild… (Rolston 
2004, 191).
Hope in this context requires patience, the patience to allow nature 
to act for itself, in other words, the strength to be passive. Human beings 
still need to learn to respect and appreciate the autonomy of nature and its 
value independent of us; this lesson is more basic than any endeavors such 
as restoration. Preservation of the relatively natural places, processes, and 
entities that still exist should be the primary focus of environmentalism. 
ConClusion: an ounCe of preservation…
To many people, restoration policy charts a course that is obviously 
the right one. Restoration is seen as the proper response to the harm we’ve 
caused and restoration efforts evoke in most people a sense of pride. How-
ever, sometimes we are misled into accepting an inadequate solution by 
our deep desire that there be a solution. My reaction to enthusiasm over 
restoration is one of very deep discomfort. Yes, I am sometimes struck by 
hints of arrogance I detect in some enthusiasm for restoration policy, but 
the overwhelming feeling I experience is one of uncomfortable sadness 
and worry. I feel the sort of sadness that one feels at witnessing the ac-
ceptance of an alleged fix which does not leave ample acknowledgement 
of the harm committed and its causes, room for remembrance, or grief 
over an irreplaceable loss. I feel a nagging worry that we are accepting a 
policy and endorsing a way of conceiving the human-nature relationship 
that really is too good to be true. 
I believe that we should also hesitate before striving for complete lib-
eration from guilt. Katz agrees with Turner and Jordan that restoration 
policies make us “feel good,” that “the prospect of restoration relieves the 
guilt we feel about the destruction of nature” (Katz 1997a, 94). But Katz 
worries about the justification and effect of this relief, and so do I. Should 
we “feel good” and enjoy the benefits of guilt alleviation? Do we deserve 
it? Is it wise? Might this not allow, even encourage us to forget our past 
wrongs? If so, might we not become more accepting of nature degrada-
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tion? The answers to these questions will depend on the extent to which 
we’ve undergone the necessary character remediation and have cultivated 
a healthy human-nature relationship. Remembering that our unhealthy 
attitudes and desires led to the environmental destruction in question will 
remain important, which is not to say we should hang our heads in shame 
for eternity. 
Instead, we should follow preservationism’s model and take a more 
passive role toward nature, which requires working extremely hard to let 
nature unfold on its own, including at times allowing nature to heal itself 
from the harm we’ve caused. In order to achieve the sort of character 
remediation Basl endorses and to cultivate the culture of nature Light 
envisions, substantial changes need to take place. These changes must 
occur not only on the behavioral level, for if behavioral changes are to be 
enduring, it is more important that change occur on the theoretical and 
psychological levels. Our ability to be more passive, as passivity ought to 
be understood, as necessarily involving strength, patience, effort, resolve, 
and humility, requires cultivation. This is the path to a true respect for 
nature, to cultivating a respect for nature on its own terms and its unique 
value. Practically this often means, as Katz puts it, “We leave nature alone” 
(Katz 2002, 144). Fully adopting a preservationist mindset is the change 
we need. Restoration should take its place within a broad preservationist 
paradigm, not the other way around. 
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notes
 1 My focus here is on the debate between environmentalists who favor either 
preservation or restoration and criticize the other. Therefore, in the context of 
this paper, when I refer to “preservationists” or “preservation” or “preserva-
tionism,” I am referring to those preservationists who criticize restoration as 
an environmental policy; when I refer to “restorationists” or “restoration” or 
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“restorationism,” I am referring to those restorationists who criticize preser-
vation as an environmental policy.
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